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WASHINGTON'S EXPANSION OF THE "PLAN"
EXCEPTION AFTER STATE V. LOUGH
Jeannie Mayre Mar
Abstract- In State v. Lough, the Washington Supreme Court ignored strong case law
limiting the admission of an accused's prior misconduct under the plan exception to evidence
rule 404(b) and upheld the admission of unproved wrongs against the accused. The plan
exception to Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits using misconduct evidence to
show propensity, but admits such evidence if used to establish a defendant's overall design or
plan to commit the charged offense. This Note analyzes the Washington Supreme Court
decision to uphold admission of a defendant's uncharged misconduct under the plan
exception. Moreover, this Note argues that the court improperly broadened the plan exception
and should not have applied the exception because the evidence's prejudicial impact
outweighed its probative value.
One of the most important premises of the American judicial system is
that no person shall be convicted by his past.' Evidence of an accused's
past wrongs creates a prejudice that is extremely difficult to overcome.2
To protect the right to a fair trial, Washington Rule of Evidence 404(b)
prohibits the use of such evidence for the purpose of showing that a
defendant has a criminal propensity.' Such evidence, however, may be
used for special purposes other than establishing criminal character. One
such purpose is to show a defendant's overall design or plan to commit
the prior and charged offenses.4
In 1995, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a
trial court's admission of highly prejudicial testimony under the plan
exception. In State v. Lough,5 a prosecution for attempted rape, the
!. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
Although the author recognizes that both male and female defendants are affected by this rule,
male pronouns will be used because many of the cases discussed involve male defendants.
2. State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 199, 685 P.2d 564, 572 (1984) (" [Sluch evidence has a great
capacity to arouse prejudice."); State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 120, 677 P.2d 131, 136 (1984)
("Statistical studies have shown that even with limiting instructions, a jury is more likely to convict a
defendant with a criminal record."), overruled by State v. Brown, Ill Wash. 2d 124, 761 P.2d 588
(1988).
3. See infra note II and accompanying text.
4. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b). The common scheme or plan is one of the exceptions which permit
admission of a defendant's prior misconduct. This Note will refer to this exception as the "plan
exception." See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
5. 125 Wash. 2d 847, 889 P.2d 487 (1995).
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victim claimed Lough drugged and raped her while she was
unconscious.' Lough appealed the trial court's admission of testimony
from four women who claimed that Lough also had raped them.7
Although the alleged prior misconduct had occurred years before and
was not connected to the present criminal charges, the supreme court
upheld admission of the evidence under the plan exception, reasoning
that the testimony assisted in showing the defendant's "plan" to drug and
rape women.8
This Note analyzes the application of the plan exception in Lough.
Part I briefly summarizes the plan exception and examines its past
application by Washington courts. Part II reviews the facts, holding, and
rationale of Lough. Part III argues that the Lough court misapplied the
plan exception and succumbed to the idea that cases involving sexual
misconduct should be treated differently under the law.9 Finally, part IV
recommends two approaches Washington courts should follow to guide
future application of the plan exception.
I. THE EXCEPTION
A. Rule 404(b)
Generally, courts admit relevant evidence unless a specific rule
prohibits admission.' One such prohibition is Rule 404(b)." Under this
rule, the prosecution may not use evidence of a defendant's "other
6. Id. at 849-50, 889 P.2d at 488-89.
7. Id. at 849-52, 889 P.2d at 488-90.
8. Id. at 861, 889 P.2d at 494-95.
9. This Note only addresses the offer of prior misconduct evidence in criminal cases. Although
Wash. R. Evid. 404(b) is not limited to criminal cases, most problems regarding the plan exception
arise in the criminal context.
10. Wash. R. Evid. 402.
11. "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the cliaracter of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." Wash. R. Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added). This rule is the ssme as Federal Rule
404(b) and conforms substantially to previous Washington law. See State v. Whalon, I Wash. App.
785, 464 P.2d 730 (1970).
Vol. 71:845, 1996
Expanding the Plan Exception
crimes, wrongs, or acts" to prove that he acted in conformity with a
"criminal" character. 2
The rule prohibits the general use of evidence of other misconduct for
two reasons. First, evidence of other misconduct may influence the jury
to decide a defendant's guilt based on character rather than the facts of
the case. 3 Jurors may be prejudiced against a defendant upon hearing
that he has a criminal record or has committed past wrongful acts.'4
Second, there is the danger that jurors would tend to grant undue weight
to evidence of a defendant's criminal history. Jurors are more likely to
convict a defendant with a criminal record.' Thus, the jury may decide
the case on an improper basis--the defendant's character-rather than on
the merits of the case. To protect against this prejudice, the rule requires
suppression of evidence when the only relevancy is to establish a
defendant's criminal propensity.
Although Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of other
misconduct to show criminal character, it admits such evidence for non-
character purposes. 6 Such other purposes include motive, opportunity,
12. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b). It should be noted that "ER 404(b) applies to evidence of other crimes
or acts regardless of whether they occurred before or after the conduct for which the defendant was
actually charged." State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 764, 682 P.2d 889, 901 (1984), overruled in
part by State v. Brown, I I Wash. 2d 124, 132, 761 P.2d 588, 593 (1988).
13. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b) does not exclude such evidence based on irrelevancy. In fact, the
evidence of other misconduct is prohibited because it may be too relevant. Its admission is limited
for policy reasons due to its highly prejudicial impact See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
475-76 (1948), quoted with approval in State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 199, 685 P.2d 564, 572
(1984).
14. The Washington Supreme Court stated that the introduction of evidence of other unrelated
misconduct is "grossly and erroneously prejudicial." State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 368, 218
P.2d 300,301 (1950).
15. State v. Burton, 101 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 676 P.2d 975, 981 (1984) (stating that evidence of other
misconduct is by its very nature prejudicial because of its inherent implication that "once a criminal,
always a criminal"), overruled by State v. Brown, Il1 Wash. 2d 761 P.2d 588 (1988); State v.
Anderson, 31 Wash. App. 352, 356, 641 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1982) (stating that jury may believe that
person once convicted of one crime will be prone to commit similar crime in future).
16. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b). The list of exceptions is not exclusive, however. Evidence of prior
misconduct may be admissible if the evidence is relevant to an issue other than propensity and its
probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Robert H. Aronson, The Law of Evidence
in Washington 404-20 (2d ed. 1993); John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 345 (4th ed.
1992); 5C Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice, Courtroom Handbook on Washington Evidence
177-78 (1995); see, e.g., State v. Goebel, 40 Wash. 2d 18, 21, 240 P.2d 251, 253 (1952), overruled
in part by State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 860, 889 P.2d 487, 494 (1995); State v. Halstien, 65
Wash. App. 845, 849-50, 829 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1992) (holding that in case of burglary with sexual
motivation, victim's testimony regarding defendant's past behavior toward victim was admissible to
identify defendant as burglar and to prove element of sexual motivation); State v. Wilson, 60 Wash.
App. 887, 890-91, 808 P.2d 754, 756-57 (1991) (stating that evidence of prior assaults on same
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intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.17 The application of this rule and its exceptions has engendered
much litigation and confusion. 8
B. The Plan Exception
The common scheme or plan exception is one of seven special
exceptions which admit evidence of uncharged offenses. 9 The plan
exception, like all Rule 404(b) exceptions, was meant to be a narrow
conduit for the admission of prejudicial evidence against a defendant.
The plan exception was meant to be limited to circumstances where the
state sought to admit evidence of a defendant's other misconduct in order
to show that the defendant had an overall mental plan to commit the
crime for which he had been charged. 0
Courts admit uncharged misconduct evidence under the plan theory
for the narrow purpose of enabling the jury to hear the whole story or get
a complete picture of what occurred during the alleged crime.2' Activities
such as stealing a gun and getaway car for a bank robbery satisfy this
purpose, and evidence of such activities is therefore admissible under the
exception, even if the only charge is for the bank robbery. 22 The goal is
victim was admissible to show victim's fear of defendant and to explain delay in reporting rape and
indecent exposure).
17. Supra note 11.
18. Proof of the confusion presiding over Wash. R. Evid. 404(b) is appareni from the enormous
number of cases involving the issue. 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein 's
Evidence 404-08, at 46-47 (1992); see also, Byron N. Miller, Note, Admissibility of Other Offenses
After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D. L. Rev. 166, 167 (1980).
19. Wash. R. Evid. 404(b).
20. Imwinkelried writes that the plan exception cases fall into two categories. The first category is
what is called the "true plan," in which the courts can permissively infer the existence of a true plan
in the defendant's mind. The test for the true plan is whether or not the uncharged misconduct is
logically relevant to show the defendant's mental plan. The second category of plan exception cases
are disparagingly called "spurious plan" cases. These are situations in which the courts have
admitted misconduct evidence under the plan exception even when the prosecutor failed to show a
plan in the defendant's mind or when the degre- of similarity was insufficient to satisfy the modus
operandi theory. Edward J. lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3:20-3:23, at 50-53
(1995).
2 1. Aronson, supra note 16, at 404-1 6; Tegland, supra note 16, at 172-74.
22. Aronson, supra note 16, at 404-16 ("Activities such as stealing the getaway car, assaulting a
customer outside the bank, or raping another victim, in the same vicinity, rear the time of the
charged crime, all fall within this category.").
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to provide a full picture for the jury by admitting evidence of connected
incidents leading up to the charged crime.'
C., Admitting Misconduct Evidence Under the Plan Exception
1. The Criteria for Admission
To avoid improper admission of misconduct evidence, Washington
courts have developed a standard for applying the plan exception.2"
Before admitting prior misconduct evidence, the court must: (1) identify
the purpose for which the State seeks admission of the evidence; (2)
decide if the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime
charged; and (3) weigh the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect.' In addition, the prosecution must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct actually occurred.26
Such steps are necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
2. Application of the Plan Exception
Although the plan exception's admission standard seems
straightfonvard, past application has generated confusion and
controversy. The plan exception has proved to be a popular theory for
introducing evidence of a defendant's other misconduct.2 7 Prosecutors
frequently rely on the plan exception because of its flexible application
and courts' liberal admission under the plan paradigm. 28 However, this
exception has recently come under attack, 9 with the heart of the
controversy revolving around the meaning of "plan."
23. State v. Tharp, 96 Wash. 2d 591, 594, 637 P.2d 961, 962 (1981) ("Each offense was a piece in
the mosaic necessarily admitted in order that a complete picture be depicted.").
24. See State v. Goebel, 40 Wash. 2d 18, 240 P.2d 251 (1952).
25. State v. Dennison, 115 Wash. 2d 609, 628, 801 P.2d 193, 203 (1990); State v. Smith, 106
Wash. 2d 772, 776, 725 P.2d 951, 952-53 (1986).
26. State v. Benn, 120 Vash. 2d 631,653, 845 P.2d 289,302, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993);
State v. Bythrow, 114 Wash. 2d 713, 719, 790 P.2d 154, 157 (1990); Tharp, 96 Wash. 2d at 593-94,
637 P.2d at 962.
27. Edward. J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve the Dispute Over the
Meaning of the Term "Plan" in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1005, 1008
(1995); Miguel A. MaeEndez &.Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme
Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged
Misconduct, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 473,473-74 (1995).
28. 2 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 140, at 257-62 (1985).
29. Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1011; MaeEndez & lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 478-79.
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There are three different interpretations of "plan." The "unlinked
plan" requires only that the prosecution show similarities between the
charged crime and the other offenses, and that the acts were temporally
proximate.3" A second, more demanding definition is the "linked
methodology" theory. Here, "plan" connotes a mental condition and the
prosecutor must show that the accused planned the methods of all the
crimes in his mind. This theory demands evidence that the accused used
the same technique and that he employed the same methodology by a
conscious choice.3' The final definition, the "linked acts" theory, is even
more restrictive. Here, the prosecution must show that the accused had an
overall design or grand scheme encompassing the charged and uncharged
crimes. Under this definition, all the crimes are related: Each criminal act
is a stage or a step in the overarching plan.32
Some commentators and courts condemn the use of the plan theory
when the prosecutor has shown only that the defendant has committed
parallel offenses.33 Other commentators and courts defend the broader
application of the plan theory.34
3. Washington Courts Are Split
Washington state courts also have experienced difficulty defining
"plan" and applying the exception. In fact, Washington courts have split
over the issue.35 Some courts have held that mere similarities between the
uncharged and charged offenses are insufficient to establish a "plan"
under Rule 404(b).36 Other courts have broadened the plan exception,
30. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, § 3:23; see MaeEndez & lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 484-
86.
31. Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1013; see MaeEndez & lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 481-
84.
32. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, § 3:21; lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1014-15; see MaeEndez
& Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 481-84.
33. Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1029; MaeEndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 478-79,
497-504.
34. People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 769 (Cal. 1994); David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other
Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 529, 547-48 (1994).
35. State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 854, 889 P.2d 487,491 (1995).
36. State v. Bowen, 48 Wash. App. 187, 191-93, 738 P.2d 316, 319-20 (1987) (stating that
claims that doctor also touched two other female patients were inadmissible as evidence of plan to
fondle breasts of third patient), abrogated by Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 889 P.2d 487; State v. Hieb,
39 Wash. App. 273, 693 P.2d 145 (1984), rev'don other grounds, 107 Wash. 2 ' 97, 727 P.2d 239
(1986) (stating that evidence that accused injured child victim before was inadmissible to show plan
in murder case because general similarity between prior offenses and crime charg.ed was insufficient
to establish plan); State v. Harris, 36 Wash. App. 746, 751, 677 P.2d 202, 205 (1984) (holding that
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holding that commission of a crime similar to the one charged is
admissible under the plan theory, even though the evidence does not
address a specific element of the crime to be proven.37 It is against this
backdrop that the Washington Supreme Court reviewed State v. Lough.
II. REVIEW OF STATE V LOUGH
Although Washington courts have reached different results regarding
the plan exception, the policy behind Rule 404(b) in protecting the
accused person's right to a fair trial has remained the same. The
Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lough," however,
ignores that purpose and expands the plan exception beyond its intended
scope.
A. Facts of the Case
Lynn Roderick Lough, a paramedic with King County Emergency
Services, met P.A. through an emergency medical training class Lough
taught at P.A.'s workplace.39 On July 22, 1988, Lough and P.A. met at
her home to watch a video. P.A. stated that Lough mixed her a drink that
made her feel dizzy and disoriented. Her memory then became confused.
She recalled her pants being pulled down and Lough's genitals in her
hands and face. She fell asleep. P.A. said that when she awoke, she was
unclothed from the waist down and Lough was gone. She found her
clothes folded on the arm of a chair.4"
Lough denied that he drugged or assaulted P.A. He testified that, after
several drinks, they started kissing and that they had consensual
intercourse.' P.A. testified that at eight o'clock the following morning,
Lough called her and asked how she was feeling.42 She stated that after
she told Lough she was confused about what had happened, he assured
two rapes, occurring two weeks before charged rape, did not qualify as links in chain forming
common plan and that at most they showed only propensity to commit rape).
37. See, e.g., State v. York, 50 Wash. App. 446, 454-58, 749 P.2d 683, 688-90 (1987) (holding
that separate incidents of sexual crimes against students at defendant's beauty school were
admissible to show plan); State v. Bennett, 36 Wash. App. 176, 180, 672 P.2d 772, 775 (1983)
(holding that prior incidents where defendant assisted runaway teenagers for sexual favors was
admissible to show "plan" of providing food and shelter to runaway teenagers for sex).
38. 125 Wash. 2d 847, 849, 889 P.2d 487,488 (1995).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 849-50, 889 P.2d at 488.
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her that nothing had happened.43 At trial, Lough denied making such a
statement. 44
P.A. never officially reported the incident, although she spoke to a
friend who was a police officer.' In 1990, after reading about an
investigation of a King County paramedic who had allegedly drugged
and raped women, she finally went to the police.46 P.A.'s allegations
prompted the county prosecutor to file charges of indecent liberties,
attempted rape, and burglary against Lough.47
B. The State's Evidence of "Other Misconduct"
At trial, the state introduced testimony from four other women who
claimed Lough also drugged and raped them between 1,978 to 1988.4
Before trial, Lough sought to exclude this testimony.49 The trial court
ruled that the evidence was admissible to show a common scheme or
plan to drug and rape women, despite the fact that none of the women
knew each other or P.A." The jury convicted Lough o1 all charges in
connection with the incident involving P.A. and Lough was given an
exceptionally long sentence of sixty months."
Lough appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it admitted
testimony from the four women. 2 On appeal, he argued that the plan
exception should apply only if the state can show that a causal
connection exists between the uncharged and charged offenses - that is,
that the prior act of misconduct was done in preparatiora for the crime
charged. 3 The Washington Supreme Court rejected Lough's argument,
reasoning that such a limitation would provide no real benefit and would
bar relevant and reliable evidence. 4
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 850, 889 P.2d at 488-89.
47. Id. at 850, 889 P.2d at 489.
48. Id. at 850-51, 889 P.2d at 489.
49. Id. at 850, 889 P.2d at 489.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 851-52, 889 P.2d at 489.
53. Id. at 855, 889 P.2d at 491.
54. Id.
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C. The Court's Holding and Rationale
The Washington Supreme Court held that the prior misconduct
evidence was admissible under the plan exception for two reasons. First,
finding a split in Washington state authority, the court relied on other
cases which applied the plan exception based only on similarities
between the uncharged and charged offenses.5 The court essentially
tailored its decision after the California case, People v. Ewoldt,56 and
applied the unlinked acts theory of the plan exception. This theory only
requires a showing of similarities among the uncharged and charged
offenses to establish a plan exception. Second, the court stated that the
manner in which Lough committed the assault on P.A. made the
evidence of prior acts necessary. Because Lough "deprived the State of
significant evidence of the victim's testimony by the way he committed
the crime," the evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct was
relevant to show that the misconduct had occurred again in the instant
case.
57
III. EVIDENCE OF LOUGH'S PRIOR CONDUCT SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED
The Lough court erred in admitting evidence of the prior alleged
assaults in what was essentially a credibility battle between the accused
and the victim. First, the plan exception was the only exception available
to the state. Although the identity exception, established through modus
operandi, would have been more appropriate, the state could not meet its
high foundational requirements.58 Second, the Lough court misapplied
the plan exception because of its reliance upon inappropriate cases,
insufficient proof, and its special treatment of sex cases.59 Finally, a
higher standard of foundational evidence should have been applied to the
plan exception in Lough.
55. Id. at 855-56, 889 P.2d at 491-92 (citing People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 767 (Cal. 1994)).
56. 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994).
57. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 859, 889 P.2d at 894.
58. Modus operandi applies only when the methods employed in committing the prior crimes and
the charged crime are so unique as to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of both crimes. See
infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 112-134 and accompanying text.
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A. The Common Scheme or Plan Exception Was the Only Option
In upholding the admission of other misconduct evidence, the supreme
court relied only on the plan exception. 60 The state argued that the
evidence should be admitted based on the plan exception6' and an "other
purpose" exception-that is, to establish an element of the crime
charged.6" It is apparent, however, that the state's other purposes
argument was an artful attempt to circumvent Rule 404(b). The only
exception that the state could have plausibly asserted was the identity
exception. Identity was not an issue in the case, however, and thus, the
state's only recourse was the plan exception.
1. The State's "Other Purpose" Was Criminal Propensity
The state asserted two exceptions to justify the trial court's admission
of the 404(b) evidence: 3 the plan exception, and the "other purpose"
exception. 6' The list of "other purposes" for which evidence of other bad
acts may be admitted under evidence rule 404(b) is riot exhaustive.65
Such evidence may be admitted if it is relevant to any purpose other than
criminal propensity and if its probative value is not outweighed by its
prejudicial impact.6
The state argued that the 404(b) evidence was needed to "corroborate
[P.A.'s] testimony and to refute Lough's defense that [P.A.] was a
conscious and active participant in the sexual activity."6 Lough testified
that he and P.A. had consensual intercourse. The burden then fell upon
the State to prove that some crime had occurred. However, P.A., the
State's only witness, was unable to positively state that anything
occurred against her will.68 To strengthen her testimony and credibility,
the State sought admission of the 404(b) evidence. The State argued that
the fact that its sole witness could not state with any certainty that a
60. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 861, 889 P.2d at 494-95.
61. Respondent's Brief at 21, Lough (No. 2E,281-6-I).
62. Id. at 33.
63. See Respondent's Brief at 21-33.
64. Id. at 21-32. The State argued that the evidence of other misconduct was necessary to show
that P.A. was not a willing participant in the sexual activity. Id. at 32.
65. Supra note 16.
66. Supra note 16.
67. Respondent's Brief at 32.
68. See Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 849-50, 889 P.2d at 488-89; Appellant's Brief at 10-1I, Lough
(No. 28281-6-1).
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crime had even occurred warranted application of the other purposes1 69
exception.
These relevancy arguments do not satisfy the two-prong test for the
"other purposes" exception under 404(b). The State must specify a
specific purpose and show that the evidence's prejudicial effect will not
outweigh its probative value.7" Corroboration usually involves testimony
by a witness who can directly verify the statement of another witness.7 A
proper example would be a witness who could testify that she heard
struggles between Lough and P.A. that night or that she saw Lough drug
P.A.'s drink. Past allegations against Lough are not corroborating
evidence because they shed no light on whether Lough committed the
charged crime. The prior misconduct showed nothing more than criminal
propensity.
Moreover, the victims of the alleged prior crimes were unable to state
with certainty that a crime occurred in each of their cases. Each witness
only claimed that she believed she was drugged and raped by Lough.72
Only one witness claimed that she awoke during intercourse.7' Even if
the testimony by the other witnesses was corroborative, its probative
value was minimal and was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial
impact.74
69. Respondent's Brief at 32.
70. See, e.g., State v. Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 829 P.2d 1145, affd, 122 Wash. 2d 109
(1993); State v. Wilson, 60 Wash. App. 887, 808 P.2d 754, rev. denied, 117 Wash. 2d 1010, 816
P.2d 1224 (1991); In re Meistrell, 47 Wash. App. 100, 733 P.2d 1004 (1987).
71. Corroborating evidence means "[e]vidence supplementary to that already given and tending to
strengthen and confirm it. Additional evidence of a different character to the same point." Black's
Law Dictionary 344-45 (6th ed. 1990). The indefinite testimony from the other witnesses against
Lough did not confirm or strengthen P.A.'s claim that she had been raped. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at
850-51, 889 P.2d at 489-90.
It should also be noted that all evidence of prior misconduct may be construed to corroborate the
claim that a defendant has committed the charged offense. The very nature of prior offenses carries
the propensity factor that always lends itself to "corroboration" of the victim's claim or that the
defendant may acted in the same manner again. The issue is not whether the misconduct evidence
corroborates, but whether the evidence is sufficiently valuable that it merits admission.
72. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 850-51, 889 P.2d at 489-90.
73. Id. at 850, 889 P.2d at 489.
74. Although the statute of limitations likely would have kept Lough from being charged for the
prior crimes, the jury might convict because it believed Lough had gotten away with the other
crimes.
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2. The Identity Exception Was Unavailable and Avoided
The most plausible exception for admitting the 404(b) evidence was to
prove the defendant's identity by showing a modus operandi. Under this
theory, such evidence would be admissible if unique or distinctive
methods could identify the perpetrator." Modus operandi is a "signature
mark" or a calling card of the perpetrator that reveals his identity."
Neither the State nor the court relied on the exception, however, because
it did not apply in Lough." The exception applies only when identity is
an issue.78 In this case, Lough's identity was not an issue.79 Moreover,
there was nothing sufficiently unique about the ciime, and the
foundational requirements necessary to establish modus Dperandi could
not be met.
Even if identity was an issue, the State could not have met the high
standard of foundational evidence required to establish modus operandi.
Although the claimed sexual assaults by the past victims appear similar
to the charged crime, mere similarity is insufficient to admit evidence
under modus operandi. The facts of the prior misconduct and the charged
offense must share common features that are so remarkably similar that
they point to the same person committing both acts.80 State v. Bowen8l
illustrates that the similarity standard requires a lesser degree of
foundational evidence which would be insufficient to satisfy modus
75. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668, 672 (1984); McCgrmick on Evidence,
supra note 16, at 449; see also Aronson, supra note 16, at 404-18.
76. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 4.22, at 278-79 (1995);
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 114, at 672--78 (2d ed. 1994).
77. The State's briefs to both the court of appeals and the supreme ccurt did not contain
arguments for admission of 404(b) evidence based upon modus operandi.
78. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 777, 684 P.2d at 672 ("Where prior acts are sought to be admitted to
show modus operandi, 'the primary purpose... is to corroborate the identity of the accused as the
person who likely committed the offense charged."' (citing State v. Irving, 24 Wash. App. 370, 374,
601 P.2d 954, 956 (1979) (emphasis added)); see also State v. Bowen, 48 Wash. App. 187, 193, 738
P.2d 316, 320 (1987) (" [T]he primary purpose of the modus operandi principle is to corroborate the
identity of the accused as the person who likely committed the offense charg.-d.") (citing State v.
Whalon, I Wash. App. 785,464 P.2d 730 (1970)).
79. Lough admitted to visiting P.A. that night. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 849, 889 P.2d at 488.
80. People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 770 (Cal. 1994) ("The greatest degree of similarity is
required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identiry."); McCormick on
Evidence, supra note 16, at 346 ("The pattern and characteristics of the crime:; must be so unusual
and distinctive as to be like a signature."); Tegland, supra note 16, at 175 (mere similarity between
prior misconduct and crime charged is insufficient to justify admitting prior misconduct; proponent
must point to something distinctive or unusual-a characteristic 'signature'--tat links defendant to
crime charged).
81. 48 Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316 (1987).
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operandi. In Bowen, the State argued that two prior allegations of
indecent touching were admissible under the plan exception because of
their similarities to the charged offense.82 The court of appeals rejected
the State's argument of the plan theory and further held that modus
operandi did not apply because identity was not an issue in the case and
because the similarities between the uncharged and charged offenses
were not distinctive enough.83
Thus, the identity exception was not available because the State could
not meet the foundational requirements necessary to establish modus
operandi. The State could not prove that Lough drugged P.A. because
there was no physical evidence, and P.A. did not see Lough put drugs in
her drink. There was also no direct proof that Lough drugged the other
alleged victims.
B. The Lough Court Misapplied the Plan Exception
In Lough, the supreme court applied the "unlinked acts" theory of the
plan exception. Thus, the State only was required to show that the prior
misconduct bore a similarity to the charged crime. But the plan
exception, like the identity exception, was meant to require a high level
of foundational evidence.
Because the purpose of the identity exception is to show the identity
of the perpetrator, unrelated prior offenses are only admissible when the
facts show that the commission of each prior offense was nearly
identical, thus satisfying a high foundational requirement. Likewise, the
plan exception only applies to admit unrelated prior offenses when the
evidence meets a high evidentiary foundation because the purpose is to
show a preconceived "plan" by the defendant to commit all the crimes.
The high foundation of evidence is meant to show the jury how the
crimes are connected. The Lough court's application of the lower
standard within the "unlinked acts" theory undercut the intent of the plan
exception and the protections of Rule 404(b).
To preserve the protections of Rule 404(b), the court should have
applied the higher foundational standard of the linked acts theory, similar
to that used for modus operandi. Traditionally, the linked acts theory has
required a showing that the uncharged and charged offenses were steps
82. All three victims were patients of Bowen who had told him that they were separated from their
husbands. Id. at 192, 738 P.2d at 320.
83. Id.
84. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d at 861, 889 P.2d at 494-95; supra notes 30, 36 and accompanying text.
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taken by the accused toward a singular goal." This showing requires a
higher degree of foundational evidence and protects the accused from the
admission of highly prejudicial evidence. In addition, the linked acts
theory protects the accused from purely opportunistic actions, which is
inadmissible as plan evidence.86
1. The Court Relied on Inappropriate Cases
Recognizing the split in Washington regarding to the plan exception,
the court followed three cases that misapplied the exception. In each
case, the court either unnecessarily applied the plan exception or
drastically lowered the foundational evidence required.. By following
these cases, the Lough court improperly broadened the plan exception.
The first case on which the Lough court relied was State v. Bennett,8 7 a
prosecution for third-degree statutory rape. The State introduced
testimony from other female victims in order to prove that Bennett had a
plan for luring teenage girls to his apartment with promises of food,
shelter, and money.88 The Washington Court of Appeals upheld the
admission of the testimony based on a similarity standard, stating that the
plan exception was established through "features common to all four
girls and their relationships to Bennett."8 9 The court stated that the
"similar acts evidence" from two of the witnesses showed a plan to lure
teenage runaways to his apartment with promises of assistance.9"
85. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, § 3:21-22.
86. The "unlinked acts" theory entirely fails to recognize the issue of purely opportunistic
behavior. Opportunistic behavior is any spontaneous action committed by the accused when a
window of opportunity suddenly becomes available. "Conduct is 'purely opportune' only if it is spur
of the moment conduct, intended to take advantage of a sudden opportunity." United State v. Ivery,
999 F.2d 1043, 1046, n.5 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United State v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir.
1992)). Such conduct, if purely spur of the moment, cannot be deemed part of a plan. Even under the
unlinked acts theory of Ewoldt, a "plan does not encompass unrelated crimes committed against
random 'targets of opportunity."' MaeEndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 491-92 (citing
People v. Williams, 751 P.2d 395,412 (Cal. 1588).
87. 36 Wash. App. 176, 672 P.2d 772 (1983).
88. The State added that the testimony was probative on the issue of whether or not sexual
intercourse occurred between the Bennett and the victim in the present case. M,1. at 179-80, 672 P.2d
at 775.
89. All the victims were female, teenage ruraways brought to the accused's apartment. Id. at 179-
80, 672 P.2d at 775.
90. Id. at 180, 672 P.2d at 775.
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Another case cited by the Lough court was State v. Roth." In Roth, the
State sought to prove that the defendant's fourth wife, Cynthia, did not
die of an accidental drowning, but was murdered by her husband for her
life insurance policy.92 The State introduced evidence of the accidental
death of Roth's second wife, Janis,93 and his collection on her insurance
policy, alleging that Roth had murdered her as well.9' The Washington
Court of Appeals upheld the admission of the prior act based on the
motive and plan exceptions, and to rebut the defendant's accident
claim.95 The court admitted the evidence based on the similarities
between the uncharged and charged offenses,96 stating that each act
showed a high degree of planning, and that the planning for the first
alleged crime would have been useful in committing the murder in the
charged offense.97
The Lough court ultimately relied upon the California decision of
People v. Ewoldt.98 In Ewoldt, the accused was convicted of committing
lewd acts and molesting his step-daughter. The California Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's admission of prior misconduct evidence that the
accused had allegedly molested his other step-daughter.99 The court did
not require that the other misconduct be part of a single plan. Instead, it
held that a plan could be shown through prior misconduct with a marked
similarity to the charged crime." °
In each of the three cases relied upon by the Lough court, the courts
mistakenly applied the plan exception. None of the cases involved prior
misconduct that was part of a common goal or a criminal plan. The
91. 75 Wash. App. 808, 881 P.2d 268 (1994), review denied, 126 Wash. 2d 1016, 894 P.2d 565
(1995).
92. Id. at 811-12, 881 P.2d at 272.
93. Id. at 812-13, 881 P.2d at 272. Janis Roth died in a mountain climbing accident prior to
Cynthia's death.
94. State argued that this evidence was relevant for other purposes, including plan, motive, modus
operandi, and rebuttal of a claim of accident Id. at 812-13, 881 P.2d at 272-74.
95. Id.
96. It should be noted that the court recognized that the plan exception should be limited to
situations where each act is an "integral part of an over-arching plan explicitly conceived and
executed by the defendant ... " Id. at 820, 881 P.2d at 276 (citing State v. Bowen, 48 Wash. App.
187, 192, 738 P.2d 316,320 (1987)).
97. Id. at 821, 881 P.2d at 276-77. To support its decision, the Roth court relied on the court of
appeals' holding in State v. Lough, 70 Wash. App. 302, 853 P.2d 920 (1993), aIfd, 125 Wash. 2d
847, 889 P.2d 487 (1995).
98. 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994).
99. Id. at 759, 763.
100. Id. at 767.
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similarities noted by each court were really methods of committing a
crime that were more suited to modus operandi analysis. However, as in
Lough, modus operandi was unavailable because identity was not an
issue in each of these cases.
Furthermore, each court substituted the plan exception for what should
have been another 404(b) exception. In Bennett, the most applicable
exception was modus operandi; however, this exception was unavailable
because nothing distinctively identified one perpetrator, and identity was
not an issue.' In Roth, the most applicable exceptions were motive and
the rebuttal of the defendant's claim of accidental death.0 2 In Ewoldt, the
court substituted the plan exception for what would have been
recognized in Washington as the 404(b) "other purpose" of "lustful
disposition."' 3
By following the reasoning of these cases, the Lough court improperly
broadened the plan exception. The plan exception was designed to admit
evidence of prior misconduct only if the facts of the case showed that the
uncharged and charged offenses were part of a common goal.
Broadening the plan exception to situations containing only "similarities"
among the offenses defeats the purpose of the plan exception and its
protections for the accused.
2. Ewoldt and the Unlinked Acts Theory Are Flawed
Ewoldt applied the unlinked acts theory of the plan exception. The
California court, however, failed to establish the level of foundational
101. See State v. Bennett, 36 Wash. App. 176, 177, 672 P.2d 772, 774.
102. The only similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses in Roth was that the
defendant collected on insurance policies. A similarity in results, however, is not enough to satisfy
the plan exception. See Ewoldt, 867 P.2d at 770; lMaeEndez & Imwinkelried, sup,-a note 27, at 497.
103. The "lustful disposition" exception is the most commonly cited of the "other purposes" and
is used to show the defendant's particular fascination toward a particular victim. Although a general
propensity to commit sex crimes is prohibited by Wash. R. Evid. 404(a) ard (b), this "lustful
disposition" is recognized by Washington courts to be sufficiently probative to overcome the
prejudice in such cases. Aronson, supra note 16, at 404-20.
Although "lustful disposition" is usually limited to evidence of the accused's prior sexual
advances upon the victim, see State v. Bemson, 40 Wash. App. 729, 737-38, 700 P.2d 758, 765
(1985), some courts have admitted evidence of sexual attacks on other victims if the victims are
limited to a particular class. See Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (extending
lustful disposition exception where complainant was member of limited class of individuals,
dependent daughters, having highly relevant common characteristics and where testimony gave jury
necessary background to explain relationship between defendant and victim). In Ewoldt, the victim's
sister probably would be considered a member o f a limited class of dependent s:ep-daughters of the
accused.
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evidence necessary for the plan exception under this theory. This
approach fails to protect against admission of purely opportunistic acts,
which are inadmissible under the plan exception. In adopting the Ewoldt
approach, the Lough Court also failed to address opportunistic behavior
that does not constitute a plan.
Ewoldt states that to show a plan, the evidence "must demonstrate 'not
merely a similarity in results, but such a concurrence of common features
that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general
plan of which they are the individual manifestations.""'  The Ewoldt
court reasoned that a marked similarity in the commission of the prior
acts and the charged offense was sufficient to show a "plan."' ' But the
court failed to explicitly lay out a standard or the level of foundational
evidence necessary to satisfy this "similarities" test.
Ewoldt attempts to compromise between the restrictive standard of the
linked acts theory and the need for probative evidence in special
circumstances. The court's error is that it compromised too much. As
Judge Mosk noted in his dissent to the Ewoldt opinion, the court
essentially traded a restrictive standard for no standard at all.0 6 This
result defeats the purpose of Rule 404(b) and improperly admits prior
misconduct evidence.
The similarity standard of the unlinked acts theory provides no set
criteria to protect against purely opportunistic actions. In Ewoldt, the
California Supreme Court held that in order to demonstrate a plan, "the
common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series
of similar spontaneous acts."'1 7 The court's reference to "spontaneous
acts" is significant.' 3 If the uncharged and charged offenses are truly
"spontaneous," then they cannot be considered connected and, therefore,
cannot be a part of a "plan."
By adopting Ewoldt without considering its nuances, the Lough court
also adopted its errors. The low standard created by the Ewoldt court and
adopted by the Lough court fails to address opportunistic behavior and
thus, fails to adequately balance the evidence's probative value against
its prejudicial impact. The prior acts alleged against Lough all qualify as
104. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d at 770 (emphasis omitted) (quoting John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in
Trials at Common Law § 304, at 249 (James A. Chadboum ed., 4th ed. 1979)).
105. Id. at 769.
106. 867 P.2d at 776 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stressing lack of any required foundational evidence
from which overarching plan could be inferred).
107. Id. at 770.
108. See MaeEndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 493.
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opportunistic actions. Even if the prosecution could have proved that the
prior misconduct actually occurred, each act could be considered a
purely spontaneous act. In other words, the accused simply saw a
window of opportunity and decided to act upon it. Such spontaneous
action is not a pre-arranged "design" and therefore would not fall under
the plan exception.
3. The Lough Court Accepted Insu fficient Proof of Prior Acts
The lower foundational standard adopted by the Lough court has
resulted in a lower standard of required proof that the alleged prior acts
actually occurred. It is well settled that prior acts must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence." 9 Even in the cases cited by the Lough
court, there was no question that the acts occurred in the manner to
which the victims and witnesses testified. In Lough, however, the prior
acts and the charged crime could not be established from :he testimony
of the alleged victims. Each witness stated that her memory of the
incident was unclear."' Despite this lack of proof, the court upheld the
admission of the uncharged misconduct."'
4. The Court May Be Treating Sex Cases Differently
The Lough court seems to have fallen into the trap of treating cases
involving sex crimes differently from cases involving other offenses.
Before Lough, courts in other jurisdictions also applied a lower
foundational standard under the plan exception for sex crimes because
the nature of sex crimes merits additional information concerning the
acts of the defendant."' Similarly, many of the Washington cases
109. State v. Tharp, 96 Wash. 2d 591, 593-94, 637 P.2d 961, 962 (1981).
110. State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 850-51, 889 P.2d 487,488-89 (1995).
111. Id. at 865, 889 P.2d at 497.
112. See, e.g., People v. Balcom, 867 P.2d 777, 781 (Cal. 1994) (finding two rapes committed in
same manner admissible to show plan by defendant and that he employed same plan to rape victim);
State v. Morowitz, 512 A.2d 175, 179 (Conn. 1936) (holding that similar sexual assault on female
patient three years before charged incidents were admissible to show plan in rape case); State v.
Grant, 33 Conn. App. 133, 138 (1993) (allowing admission of evidence that defendant engaged in
sexual activity with one daughter in trial involving other daughter under common scheme or plan);
Sheppard v. State, 659 So.2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1995) (holding that testimony of defendant's daughter
that she had been sexually assaulted in past by defendant was admissible in prosecution of rape);
State v. Rawls, 649 So.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Fla. 1995) (holding testimony of thr.e other boys who
testified that defendant had raped them admissible in case of sexual battery of person of less than 12
years, based on argument that defendant's conduct was "strikingly similar"); People v. Oliphant, 250
N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1976) (holding that testimony of three witnesses that they Nad been raped by
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applying the similarities standard are sex cases."' The only two cases
since Lough, State v. Pirtle"4 and Keene v. Edie,"5 illustrate the
emerging double standard between sex crimes and other crimes.
In Pirtle, the accused was convicted of two counts of aggravated first-
degree murder."' The defendant subdued two fast food employees, stole
$4200, and then beat and killed the employees." 7 The State argued that
one of the aggravating circumstances was that the murders were
committed as a part of a common scheme or plan." 8
Although Pirtle concerns aggravating factors in a murder and does not
address evidentiary issues, the court's discussion of the plan exception in
relation to the common plan aggravator is illuminating. In refuting the
defendant's argument that the common scheme or plan aggravator is
unconstitutionally vague, the court defined the aggravator between
murders as requiring a "nexus between the killings."'".9 The court further
held that this interpretation of the common scheme or plan aggravator is
consistent with the "traditional understanding of common scheme or plan
within the rules of evidence."'20 Citing Lough, the Pirtle court held that a
common scheme or plan under the rules of evidence may be established
where "several crimes constitute constituent parts of a plan in which each
crime is but a piece of the larger plan."'' Although the Pirtle court could
defendant in past admissible in separate case of rape and gross indecency); Turnbow v. State, 451
P.2d 387, 390 (Okla. 1969) (two prior incidents of sexual assault admissible to show plan in rape
case); State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193 (S.D. 1985) (admitting testimony of witness who testified that
defendant had raped her).
113. See, e.g., State v. Bacotgarcia, 59 Wash. App. 815, 801 P.2d 993 (1990) (holding prior
misconduct involving prostitution admissible in prostitution and rape case, even though appellate
court had noted that such admission of prior misconduct was questionable under plan exception or
any exception), review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1020, 811 P.2d 219 (1991) ; State v. York, 50 Wash.
App. 446, 749 P.2d 683 (1987) (stating that separate incidents of sexual assaults upon young
students near defendant's beauty school were admissible in separate trials to show common scheme
or plan by defendant), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1009 (1988); State v. Bennett, 36 Wash. App.
176, 672 P.2d 772 (1983).
114. 127 Wash. 2d 628, 904 P.2d 245 (1995).
115. No. 33105-1-I, slip. op. (Wash. Ct. App. May 1, 1995) (unpublished opinion).
116. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 638-40, 904 P.2d at 252-54.
117. Id. at 638-39, 904 P.2d at 252-53.
118. Id. at 638, 904 P.2d at 252.
119. Id. at 661-62, 904 P.2d at 264 (citing State v. Dictado, 102 Wash. 2d 277, 285, 687 P.2d
172, 178 (1984)).
120. Id. at 662, 904 P.2d at 264.
121. Id. (citing State v. Lough, 125 Wash. 2d 847, 855, 889 P.2d 487, 491-92 (1995). The Pirtle
Court also referred to State v. Bowen, 48 Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316 (1987), to support the
linked act interpretation of the plan exception. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 662.
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have applied the lower similarity standard found in Lough, it followed
the more stringent requirement set out in Bowen
22
In Keene v. Edie, an adult victim brought a tort action for damages
against her friend's father for childhood sexual abuse. "2 In the tort
action, Keene introduced evidence of similar sexual abuse by the
defendant upon another childhood friend and his two daughters.'24
Although each witness claimed that the defendant touched her breasts
and fondled them in exchange for gifts or special treatment, 125 none of
the alleged misconduct involved a similar method,'26 Despite differences
in the alleged offenses, 127 the appellate court applied the unlinked acts
theory, holding that similarities between the prior misconduct and the
subject of the tort action were sufficient to establish the common scheme
or plan exception. ' Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
decision to admit the prior misconduct.'29
Commentators have noted a growing number of state laws granting
more liberal admission of prior acts evidence in cases involving sex
crimes. '  Sexual crimes, such as rape, lewd conduct, and child
molestation, shock the public conscience. The anger and horror from
such heinous crimes can lead to condemnation of the accused and a
public crusade against every sexual offender.'3 '
Although commentators claim that evidence of a delendant's prior
offenses is necessary to inform the jury,13 2 the fact remains that the
122. Id. at 661,904 P.2d at 264.
123. Keene, No. 33105-1-I, slip. op. (Wash. Ct. App. May 1, 1995) (unpublist ed opinion).
124. Id. at 1316-17.
125. Id.
126. The court noted that the evidence showed a method that was "almost a rmodus operandi." Id.
at 1314 n.2. The court was incorrect. The results were the same, but not the methads.
127. Id. at 1316-17.
128. Id. at 1316-18.
129. Id. at 1318.
130. See David J. Kaloyanides, Comment, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of
the Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B), 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1297, 1307 (1992); see also Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All: The Admissibility of Uncharged
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S.
Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 501, 510, 524-(1996).
131. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, Note, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Rules of
Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 Wash. L. Rev.
883, 901 (1995).
132. See, e.g., David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Se" Offense Cases and
Other Cases, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 15, 30 (1994). For a response to the Karp article, see Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Some Comments About Mr. David Karp's Remarks on Propensity Evidence, 70 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 37 (1994).
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probability of predicting the reoccurrence of rape is no better than
predicting the reoccurrence of murder.'33 Prosecutors very likely seek
such sexual evidence not for the purpose of predicting behavior,
however, but for the purpose of providing an inflammatory suggestion to
the jury. 34 Because the prejudice generated from such evidence can
overwhelm its probative value, it should not be admitted.
C. The Lough Court Should Have Applied a Higher Standard
The Washington Supreme Court should have required the prosecution
to show that the prior misconduct in Lough was part of a larger criminal
design-individual steps toward a common goal by the accused-to meet
the plan exception. Washington precedent correctly limits the common
scheme or plan exception to this interpretation.
1. The Court Should Have Followed State v. Bowen
In State v. Bowen, a patient claimed that her physician fondled her
breasts. 35  Under the plan exception, the prosecution introduced
testimony of two other patients, both of whom claimed that the doctor
had also sexually assaulted them. 36 The State asserted that, because all
133. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in
Sex Offender Cases, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 155 (1993).
134. Commentators have supported legislation to amend the rules of evidence in order to admit
prior misconduct evidence based on arguments that sexual offenders are a danger to society because
rapists are particularly likely to repeat their crimes. Karp, supra note 132, at 20. Supporters of the
recently passed Federal Rules of Evidence 412-413 have implied that the rules' special exception for
admission of sexual prior misconduct was necessary based on repeated offenses by rapists and child
molesters. See 140 Cong. Rec. S 12990-01; see also Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rules of Evidence 413:
A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 57, 75-76 (1995).
In fact, recent data suggest that rapists are no more likely to re-offend that other classes of
criminals. A Bureau of Justice Statistics recidivism study released in 1989 found that only 7.7% of
rapists were re-arrested for rape within the last three years. In contrast, 19.6% of released robbers
were re-arrested for robbery, 21.9 % of defendants convicted for assault were re-arrested for assault,
31.9% of released burglars were re-arrested for burglary and 33.5% of released larcenists were re-
arrested for larceny. Allen J. Beck, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, in Bureau of Justice
Statistics 6 (1989). Only released murderers had a lower recidivism rate at 6.6%. Id. Such statistics
do not support the argument that the crime of rape should be treated differently because of high
recidivism among sex offenders.
135. 48 Wash. App. 187, 188-89, 738 P.2d 316,318 (1987).
136. One witness testified that she was fondled two months before the charged incident. The
second witness testified that she was fondled during a medical visit to her home about a year before
the charged incident. Id. at 189; see also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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three crimes were substantially similar,'37 the uncharged offenses should
be admitted to show Bowen's "plan" to assault female patients separated
from their husbands. 3' The court of appeals held the testimony from the
two witnesses inadmissible under the plan theory and reversed the trial
court decision.'39 The court concluded that the State failed to satisfy the
plan exception because it did not show specific connections between the
uncharged and charged offenses. In the absence of such connections, the
court noted that admitting such evidence only would serve to unduly
prejudice the jury, and, thus, constituted prejudicial error. 4 '
In Lough, each victim also made similar claims of sexual assault.
Although the State argued that the accused used the same method of
incapacitating each woman before intercourse, none of the claimed
similarities show any connection b etween the uncharged and charged
offenses in a manner that suggested a larger criminal design.
Furthermore, the facts in Lough are less reliable than those in Bowen. In
Bowen, the victims were able to recount the sexual touching incidents. In
Lough, however, none of the victims could give reliable and detailed
testimony as to what had occurred.
2. A Higher Standard Is Appropriate
Bowen illustrates that both the plan and identity exceptions should
have similarly high foundational requirements. The unlinked acts theory
fails to establish this high standard and compromises the protections of
Rule 404(b). The only interpretation of the plan exception that sets a
proper level of foundational evidence is the linked acts theory.
In cases applying the linked acts theory,'14 Washington -ourts seek to
uphold the intent behind Rule 404(b). The linked acts theory protects the
accused from the prejudicial impact of prior crimes or alleged illegal
acts. In demanding proof of an overall design connecting the prior
misconduct and the charged offense, the linked acts standard correctly
requires that the prosecution meet a high foundational requirement.
137. The trial court stated that there were similarities establishing a plan. For example, each
woman was a patient and each had told the defendant that they were separated from their husbands.
Id. at 192, 738 P.2d at 320.
138. Id. at 189-90, 738 P.2d at 318-19.
139. Id. at 192, 738 P.2d at 320; see also supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 195-96, 738 P.2d at 321-322.
141. See infra notes 36, 87-103 and accompanying text.
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The linked acts standard also rejects the notion that a few similarities
between the prior misconduct and the charged crime are enough to show
a plan. Courts applying the linked acts theory have consistently stated
that such similarities are not of sufficient probative value to overcome
their prejudicial effect.'42 These courts recognize that, although there may
be some minimal value in establishing a "plan," the true power behind
such evidence lies in its prejudicial impact upon the jury. 43 The linked
acts standard protects against such danger by requiring a level of relevant
evidence that logically supports application of the plan exception.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE
PLAN EXCEPTION IN WASHINGTON COURTS
Washington courts should consider two options when the prosecution
seeks to admit evidence under the plan exception. First, courts should
admit evidence of prior sexual offenses under the lustful disposition
exception when appropriate.'" Second, courts should apply two versions
of the linked acts theory of the plan exception.
Washington courts already admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct
under the lustful disposition exception.'45 The courts can use the lustful
disposition exception to absorb many of the misapplied plan cases by
identifying classes of victims. Certainly lustful disposition would apply
to most rape cases involving the defendant's daughter, as in Ewoldt. The
exception could also be expanded to admit evidence of other victims.
Although the lustful disposition exception is usually limited to admitting
evidence of prior sexual misconduct by the defendant on the same
victim, the courts could identify other classes of victims that would
142. Bowen, 48 Wash. App. at 191-92, 738 P.2d at 320 (stating that points of similarity were
insufficient to satisfy plan exception and demonstrated "little more than general propensity to
commit indecent liberties, precisely the purpose forbidden under ER 404(b)"); State v. Hieb, 39
Wash. App. 273, 693 P.2d 145 (1984) (holding evidence that accused had injured child on other
occasions was inadmissible to show common plan or scheme in prosecution for murder of child),
reversed on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986); State v. Harris, 36 Wash. App.
746, 677 P.2d 202 (1984) (holding that evidence of two alleged rapes, two and a half weeks apart,
did not constitute common scheme or plan to commit crime charged and did not qualify as links in
chain forming common design, scheme, or plan).
143. "Prosecutors relish proffering uncharged misconduct evidence because they realize that it is
so devastating to the defense." MaeEndez & lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 474. "Prosecutors favor
uncharged misconduct evidence precisely because they know that it is one of 'the most prejudicial
[types of] evidence imaginable."' Id. (citing People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986)
(alteration in original)).
144. See supra note 103.
145. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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qualify under the lustful disposition exception. The courts could set a
criteria of characteristics for identifying victims limited to a particular
class. 46 If tailored properly to avoid prejudicial impact outweighing the
probative value, classes of victims could include patients of doctors,
children in restricted areas, and close relatives. If Was'hington courts
decide to expand the classes of victims, similarities and relationships
among the defendant to the victims could be explored without the need to
resort to expansion of the more general plan exception.
Second, courts should apply one of two versions of the linked acts
plan exception. The first linked acts theory was enumerated by the court
in Bowen. 47 This theory requires that the prosecution shcw a connection
between the prior offenses and the charged crime. The second theory is
the linked methodology theory.'48 Under this theory, the prosecutor must
establish that the common methodology used in the prior offenses and
the charged offense was in fact planned by the accused. 49 Under this
interpretation, the plan exception applies when the prosecutor shows that
the accused developed a preconceived modus operandi that he "planned"
to use whenever the opportunity presented itself.150
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court improperly broadened the common
scheme or plan exception to Evidence Rule 404(b) in State v. Lough. In
an attempt to respond aggressively to a difficult case that did not meet
the high requirements of modus operandi, the court lowered the
foundational requirements to the point that any evidence which does not
meet the requirements for modus operandi can be readily admitted under
the plan exception. Although Washington courts thus far have limited the
application to sexual crimes, the low standard established in Lough sets a
dangerous precedent for all future criminal cases. The courts ought to
146. See supra note 103.
147. 48 Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316 (1987).
148. See lmwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1013; MaeEndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at
483-84.
149. See Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1013; MaeEndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at
483-84.
150. See Imwinkelried, supra note 27, at 1013. This theory, however, requires proof that the
accused actually formulated a plan or modus operandi. This requirement is iot satisfied by mere
repetition of results and a few similar facts. Instead, this standard require nearly the same modus
operandi in each case and evidence of a plan by the accused. See People v. Corona, 145 Cal. Rptr.
894 (App. 1978) (holding that ledger containing names of victims tends to show how defendant
selected victims).
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apply the more stringent linked acts standard and consider all the
exceptions before admitting prior misconduct evidence. This approach
properly balances the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect and upholds Rule 404(b)'s purpose of protecting the
accused's right to an impartial trial.

